Depressions have proven to be more interesting than booms to students of Latin America: the early 1890s, the crisis of 1920-21 and the 1930s have received more attention than booms before and after. Scholarly morbidity is not the only explanation for this apparent bias for gl(iom: negative external shocks arising from the international economy have long; been viewed in Latin America as leading both to short-term economic and political autonomy, with net welfare consequences of crises being moot.
The story of the 1930s in at least the larger or nore autonomous Latin American countries has been particularly influential in generating a sanguine attitude toward external shocks. By the 1970s it could be argued that economies and public sectors that weathered remarkably well the shocks of the 1930s were even better prepared, fifty years and much industrialization later, to handle whatever the international economy threw at them in the 1980s.
That optimism was flawed. Available evidence indicates that while the severity of the quantifiable external shock has been irilder during the early 1980s than during the early 1930s, the performance of at least several major Latin American economies has been weaker in the recent period. In Argentina,
Brazil and Chile, per capita gross domestic product and industrial output do worse in the early 1980s Chan in the early 1930s (see Diaz-Alejandro 1983 , pp. 8-9, Naciones Unidas, 1983b , Table 2 ). While data do not always allow precise comparisons, Mexico and Venezuela appear to do better during the most recent depressive episode, for obvious reasons. Colombian performance during both crises is relatively strong. While several Latin American countries recovered earlier and faster than the United States during the early 1930s, the opposite has occurred during the early 1980s in all countries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: similarities between the two historical episodes well first be discussed, including parallels in their preceeding conditions. Salient contrasts will then be analyzed, both regarding the structures of the Latin American economies, and in their links with the international economy. Conclusions and caveats will close Che paper.
II. SIMILARITIES.
Similarities between the 1980s and the 1930s may be found in the booms that preceeded them; in the nature of the external shocks; and in some aspects of the domestic response.
Both the late 1920s and the late 1970s witnessed significant capital inflows into Che major Lacin American economies. ExCernal terms of trade and demand for exports were reasonably good, with precise conditions for each country depending on the commodity lottery. As during other "good times" in the history of these economies, there was a tendency for international reserves to grow and for nominal exchange rates to lag behind the difference between domestic and external inflation. As during the late 1920s, when most Latin American countries sought fixed nominal exchange rates (in the context of the gold standard), during the late 1970s and very early 1980s some countries moved either to fix nominal exchange rates, or to fix their rate of change ahead of time. The combination of external circumstances and domestic policy in both episodes led to real exchange rates that were overvalued relative to the historical norm. It is likely that this phenomenon could also be found during othjr boom periods in Latin American economic history. It also appears that caiital inflows during both the 1920s and the 1970s generated significant expansions in public expenditures, either in the form of public works (daring the 1920s), or in investments by public enterprises (during the 1970s).
The deterioration in the commodity terms of trade during the early 1980s has approached, for some countries, the magnitude of the collapse of the early 1930s. A severe cut in the volume of imports, from cyclical peak to trougn, is shared by both historical experiences. The orders of magnitude are similar for some countries, such as Argentina and Mexico, as may be seen in Table 2- The same Table, Exchange rate devaluations were a crucial element in the adjustment of early 1930s. Abandonment of gold standard parities came early in some countries, while others waited until they were forced into devaluation by and similarly for the opposite phenomena once the boom collapses.
As during the 1930s, large devaluations were accompanied by either the tightening or the introduction of exchange controls., even in countries such as Mexico with a tradition of free convertibility, and even where Central Bank officials were on record as opposing them. After the devaluations there was probably some redundancy in exchange control mechanisms, but public officials burned by capital account shocks and sudden capital flights preferred to keep them around, at least as stand-by policy tools.
An induced increase in public sector deficits during "bad tiroes" is another cyclical regularity connnon to the early 1980s and early 1930s.
In contrast with the early 1930s, however, one cannot find during the early 1980s examples of autonomous increases in the budget deficit comparable to those documented for Brazil, involving the coffee valorization scheme. We now turn to this and other salient contrasts between the two depressive episodes in Latin America.
III. CONTRASTS. Viewed from the import side, some of these changes offer clues for explaining the contrasts in performance. The ratio of imports to home production was indeed larger in the late 1920s than in the late 1970s; imports also included then many items than were competitive rather than complementary to domestic production. Import restrictions during the late 1920s were milder in most Latin American countries than during the late 1970s. There was ample room for import substitution when relative prices changed in the early 1930s, as a result of real devaluations and tighter import restrictions. The Brazilian import bill of the early 1980s
is not so easily dented, as after many years of extreme protectionism it It is tempting to conclude that the 1980s are more like the 1890s than like the 1930s in Latin America. But it is more accurate to
